Izvestiya, May 12, 2000

The KGB's successor, the FSB, has inherited Stalin-era anti-Semitism… These organs have always been the primary source of the anti-Semitism that has clearly marked Soviet and Russian policies. 

Retired KGB Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky writing in The Moscow Times, October 27, 2000 

This report, which focuses on antisemitism, xenophobia and religious persecution in 74 of Russia's 89 regions, is an attempt to assess these multiple threats. It describes violent acts against Jews (the attack on a Jewish school in Ryazan, murders and kidnappings of Jews in the Northern Caucasus, Moscow and Saratov), numerous instances of collaboration between antisemitic groups and provincial officials, widespread racist attacks on ethnic minorities, especially people from the Caucasus, and efforts to de-legitimize and brand as "totalitarian sects" Christian minority congregations in almost every region covered. As in previous years, these attacks take place within a climate of near total impunity, further emboldening the purveyors of hate. 

Antisemitism tends to be cyclical in nature. Currently, Russia is coming off of what was arguably the worst such cycle since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Starting shortly after the August 1998 financial collapse, Russia's Jewish community was beleaguered both by violence-inciting antisemitic rhetoric from leading members of the Communist Party and a rash of attacks on Jews and Jewish 

The Yeltsin government's inability to control Russia's 89 regions, reform the highly corrupt and brutal justice system, and arrest and prosecute violent antisemitic groups and individuals led to a climate of impunity that facilitated these dangerous threats to Jewish safety. Outside of Moscow, antisemitism has become institutionalized in several regions, with alliances forged between local authorities (many of whom are members of the openly antisemitic Communist Party), neo-Nazi and/or Cossack paramilitary groups, and antisemitic elements within the Russian Orthodox Church, the de facto state religion. Despite the greater stability and the partial crackdown on hate groups that has accompanied Vladimir Putin's rise to power, these alliances are still in place in many of the 74 regions that this report covers. In addition, President Putin's reliance on the security services, his apparent contempt for civil society, and the reemergence of large scale secrecy paranoia present a new set of problems for Russia's Jews, who will only truly be safe in a democratic country where laws protecting vulnerable minorities are enforced. 

Under the Yeltsin administration, Russia's regions became increasingly independent of the central government. The rapid de-centralization of power in Russia over the past decade has resulted in a system of near feudal despotism, in which provincial officials routinely violate their citizens' human rights with almost total impunity. Widespread violations of human rights in 60 regions of Russia have been documented in a recent report by the Moscow Helsinki Group ("Human Rights in the Regions of the Russian Federation: 1999"), which is available on UCSJ's web site (www.FSUMonitor.com). Jews have been left at the mercy of local authorities, some of whom openly or covertly support antisemitic groups, and most of whom are largely indifferent to the Jewish community's concerns. 

The situation in Krasnodar Kray is a blatant example of a region where antisemitism and xenophobia have been allowed to go unchecked by the central government. Governor Nikolai Kondratenko has publicly accused Jews, 12,000 of whom live in his region, of conspiring to destroy Russia and somehow "inventing" homosexuality. In a May 2000 speech, Kondratenko stated that Zionism has become the "most aggressive and bloody force" in the world, and that Zionists and American imperialists are working together to incite ethnic conflict in Russia and "zombify" its population. Ethnic minority groups are routinely terrorized by armed Cossacks, who have been given wide ranging police powers in Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov. 

Despite these rampant illegalities, President Putin recently awarded Governor Kondratenko a medal for outstanding service to Russia. Notwithstanding his avowed commitment to fighting antisemitism, it appears that Putin does not judge antisemitic behavior to be a basis for nullifying the political legitimacy of regional leaders. This impression was solidified by the Kremlin's weak reaction to the antisemitic statements of the newly elected governor of Kursk, Aleksandr Mikhaylov, who said in a November 2000 interview that he and President Putin were allies in the struggle 

Skinheads from Russia's largest neo-Nazi group, Russian National Unity (RNU), have mounted joint patrols with police in the major provincial cities of Voronezh, Bryansk, Kstovo, and Kostroma, and the mayors of Stavropol and Balakovo publicly voiced their support for the violent hate group. In July 2000, the RNU was accepted onto an official advisory body of the Saratov regional legislature, after having already been accepted onto a similar body under the mayor of Saratov. 

The official newspapers of the regional administrations of Vladimir and Oryol regularly publish antisemitic articles, as do unofficial newspapers in dozens of regions across the country. The publishing of material aimed at inciting ethnic or religious hatred is prohibited by law in Russia under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. As in Germany, where Nazi symbols are banned, the authors of the Russian Criminal Code obviously viewed such publications as criminally dangerous in an unstable society with a history of persecuting certain ethnic and religious minority groups. 

It was in the relatively liberal city of Moscow, one of only two regions to ban the RNU, that the worst antisemitic violence in recent years has taken place. From May-July 1999, the cycle of antisemitism hit its peak with a wave of terrorist attacks on Jewish sites. It was only through blind luck that dozens or even hundreds of Jews were not killed or injured. As is the norm in such cases, nobody was arrested for any of these bombings. UCSJ has documented numerous other attacks on Jews and Jewish sites throughout the country, the vast majority of which remain unsolved. 

The rise of Vladimir Putin to power has been accompanied by a large degree of political stability. He is currently enjoying enormous popularity at home, while showing an increasing lack of concern for democratic values and Western opinion. His commitment to re-centralize political power is popular with all but the affected regional leaders. He is seen as cracking down on the widely hated, mostly Jewish "oligarchs," though many observers have noted that several officials and businessmen linked with corruption under Yeltsin have not been touched. His authoritarian instincts are broadly seen as a tonic, not a threat, by a public demoralized by Yeltsin's failures in the name of reform and democracy. And the virtues, indeed necessity, of reforming a corrupt and law-averse society, making it hospitable to minorities, human rights, environmental security, and religious freedom, are neither high on the Russian public's agenda nor on that of many in the West, who primarily seek assurances that they can "do business" with Putin.

This new found stability, combined with President Putin's public vows to fight antisemitism and bring a "dictatorship of the law" to Russia's lawless provinces, led to a noticeable decrease in violent antisemitic incidents in 2000. In some regions, local and federal authorities have launched crackdowns against hate groups, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness. However, in other regions institutionalized antisemitism remains entrenched, and it remains to be seen if the authorities are willing to consistently target extremist groups, rather than just occasionally detain a few of their members and prematurely declare victory over political extremism. In addition, Putin's heavy reliance on the FSB (the former KGB) in his appointments, and his apparent lack of respect for democracy and a free press, may create new problems for Russia's Jews, who will never be safe until 

President Putin has recently divided supervisory responsibility over Russia's 89 regions into seven federal districts, whose chiefs are directly subordinate to the President. These presidential plenipotentiaries are responsible for "organizing control over the execution" of federal law and presidential edicts. This step is Putin's strongest effort to date to fulfill his campaign promise to bring order to Russia's unruly federal structure. But under current Russian conditions, characterized by the near absence of rule of law, Putin's determination to "get tough" on regional bosses could lead to a new series of problems. Five of the seven presidential plenipotentiaries are career military or KGB men. During the Soviet period, the KGB was by far the most antisemitic branch of the Soviet power structure. The newly appointed representative for the North-West region, Viktor Cherkesov, was a notorious KGB agent who has the dubious honor of both making the last known arrest on political charges in Soviet history in 1988 and of opening the case against environmental whistleblower Aleksandr Nikitin, Amnesty International's first Russian "prisoner of conscience" since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cherkesov's former spokesman in the FSB, Yevgeny Lukin, recently wrote a revisionist history book that shifts responsibility for the mass killings committed in the early years of Soviet rule from the KGB as a whole onto Jews working within the KGB. Lukin later became chief of information at Petersburg Television, which broadcast a show inciting mob violence against ethnic minorities shortly after his appointment. 

It is especially ominous, but not surprising given his professional background, that President Putin is increasingly treating pro-democracy activists and political opponents like modern day versions of Soviet dissidents. Two cases are illustrative. Alexander Nikitin wrote a report identifying the massive threat of nuclear contamination of the oceans, a report whose dissemination is expressly guaranteed by the Russian constitution. He was arrested and prosecuted for treason over a period of 4 ½ years. Several courts rejected the basis of the case and in December 1999, he was acquitted. In April 2000, a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court approved the acquittal. Meanwhile, President Putin used the case to indict environmental NGOs as fronts for foreign intelligence agencies. The only point of this case, as well as the sustained efforts to de-register environmental and human rights NGOs, was political— to intimidate environmental whistle blowers and human rights activists.

The case of Vladimir Gusinsky is more nuanced, but of a similar bent. His arrest in Moscow in June 2000 was heralded as a move against the widely hated "oligarchs." But as the most independent media mogul and critic of the Putin regime, his arrest was clearly meant to intimidate independent journalists. Nor did the Jewish community of Russia miss the point that even its most powerful member was vulnerable. The prosecutor in charge of the case, in defending the arrest, explicitly made this connection by asserting that even a media executive and vice president of the World Jewish Congress is not above the law. In mid-December 2000, as this report was being finalized, Gusinsky was arrested in Spain, where he was in effect a political exile, and faced possible extradition to Russia on the basis of an Interpol order requested by the Russian government. It is not clear why Interpol felt the need to honor the request from the Russian justice system, widely seen as corrupt and politicized, to extradite one of President Putin's most prominent critic. The Spanish government's decision to jail Gusinsky pending the results of an extradition hearing was equally appalling, given the clear political motivation behind the Russian arrest warrant. The Gusinsky case makes clear the relationship between strictly Jewish and broader human rights threats posed by a 

The worst case scenario would be if Russia's Jews end up facing a combination of post-Soviet threats (the alliance between neo-Nazi and Cossack paramilitary groups, local authorities, many of whom are members of the Communist party, and antisemitic elements within the Russian Orthodox Church) and a partial return of the dangers they faced in the Soviet Union (the dominance of the historically antisemitic security apparatus, leading to official suppression of the free press, environmental and human rights NGOs, and other elements of civil society). As this report documents, there are already signs that this nightmare combination of the worst elements of Russia's post-Soviet chaos and the USSR's iron fisted authoritarianism are beginning to emerge. The next year will thus be a crucial time for determining the future safety of Russian Jewry. 

· Antisemitic threats and violent hate crimes against Jews dramatically increased across the Russian Federation between 1998-99, while decreasing in 2000. Nonetheless, Jews continue to face specific dangers not only through incidents of antisemitic hate crimes, but from an infrastructure of antisemitism, at the grassroots and official levels, that has solidified in several regions, as local officials have allied themselves with communist, neo-Nazi, Cossack, Russian Orthodox and other sources of antisemitic activity. These forces act with near complete impunity, sending the message that neither the central nor local governments will provide for the physical or political safety of Russian Jews.

· President Putin has made strong rhetorical commitments to fight antisemitism. During his presidency, the number of violent antisemitic incidents has declined. A crackdown has been launched against some hate groups, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness from region to region. In several regions, however, local officials continue to incite antisemitism, without suffering clear negative consequences from the central government. 

· President Putin's apparent contempt for many aspects of civil society, including environmental and human rights NGOs and a free press, may lead to new threats to Russian Jews, as the Jewish community will never be safe unless Russia develops a law-based, democratic system. Another serious potential threat is posed by the appointment of several former KGB officers to influential government posts. During the Soviet period, the KGB was considered the most antisemitic branch of the Soviet power structure.

· Jews and other targets of the RNU and other youth-oriented hate groups face an uncertain future in Russia due to these groups' continuing popularity with disaffected Russian youth. As the country's economic, social and ethnic situation continues to stagnate, this trend is likely to continue.

· At the national level, particularly in the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) has revived antisemitism as a leading plank in its platform. Communist antisemitism, as espoused by party chief Gennady Zyuganov, takes the traditional Soviet approach of couching antisemitic rhetoric in the language of anti-Zionism, while KPRF parliamentarians and governors directly defame and incite violence against Jews. 

· Russia's failure to successfully create a rule of law-based state, and severe problems of torture and lawlessness on the part of the police and other authorities, have created a dangerous environment for all citizens of the Russian Federation, but particularly for members of minority populations. This trend constitutes a passive form of official antisemitism, since victims cannot, in general, count on the police, prosecutors, or the courts for protection from hate crimes. 

· Attacks on ethnic minorities are common, as are xenophobic public statements by national and regional officials, parties and groups, and national and regional media. Unconstitutional residency requirements in cities like Moscow, and police targeting of ethnic minorities, especially Chechens and Meskhetian Turks, for extortion, torture and expulsion are of serious concern for Russia's future as a multi-ethnic state. The state sponsored demonizing of the entire Chechen people has obvious negative implications for other unpopular minority groups, including Jews.

· Antisemitism in Russia often goes hand in hand with anti-Western, and specifically anti-American sentiments. In Russia, antisemitism is the common language for the united opposition to democratic reform and cooperation with the United States, and Russian Jews are regularly accused of being part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Russia. NATO's actions in Kosovo, and the West's criticism of Russia's war in Chechnya, have greatly exacerbated this trend.

· Official secrecy paranoia has been rising dramatically over the past couple of years. Environmental activists, scientists, foreign citizens, and members of minority religious groups have been accused of spying. Almost a decade after the fall of the USSR, some Jews are still refused permission to emigrate on the basis of their alleged knowledge of state secrets. Russia is becoming increasingly isolated as a result of this "spy mania."

· Human rights and other civil society issues are more than just "feel good" issues that should be de-prioritized in relation to traditional security and trade issues — they are crucial building blocks in the creation of a rule of law state attractive to both foreign and domestic investment. Unfortunately, both the US and Russian governments have so far failed to sufficiently take into account human rights and civil society issues in the context of broader economic and political reforms.
 

Micah H. Naftalin                          Nickolai Butkevich
National Director                           Editor
Union of Councils for                     Union of Councils for 
Soviet Jews                                    Soviet Jews