Volume 2, Number 26
Wednesday, July 3, 2002

BIGOTRY MONITOR
A Weekly Human Rights Newsletter on Antisemitism, Xenophobia, and Religious Persecution in the Former Communist World and Western Europe

EDITOR: CHARLES FENYVESI
(News and Editorial Policy within the sole discretion of the editor)

Published by UCSJ: Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union
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U.S. DEMANDS IMMUNITY FROM INTERNATIONAL COURT. The Bush administration is heading for a confrontation with most of the rest of the world and especially the 15-nation European Union (EU) on the subject of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Due to open for business on July 8, the ICC has been hailed by its advocates as the most important human rights institution since the establishment of the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal. On July 2 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that America might not send its forces to join future peacekeeping missions without a grant of full immunity from ICC jurisdiction. Speaking on behalf of the administration, Rumsfeld argued that American troops and government officials must be exempt from the court. Two days earlier the United States vetoed a Security Council resolution extending the UN peacekeeping mandate in Bosnia. The veto, reflecting the U.S. perception that the ICC violates American sovereignty, has prompted sharp criticism from Britain and other U.S. allies that see the Bush administration as stuck in a unilateralist stance.

In an article published on July 1 in London’s “Financial Times” titled “Human Rights, American Wrongs,” Kenneth Roth, head of Human Rights Watch, argued that “unless Europe acts decisively, the cause of international justice will be imperiled,” as the exemption demanded would undermine the court’s universality and “severely damage its credibility.” Roth accused the Bush administration of “breathtaking arrogance,” hoping that the EU, which “has adopted a legally binding common position to defend the letter and spirit of the court's treaty,” will cave in to Washington’s “bluster and threats.”

In the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” of June 28, journalist Reinhard Muller struck a gentle tone, noting that “the ICC only has the power that signatory countries give it. It is often precisely in the national interest of a state to agree by treaty to maintain certain common values.” He reminded the Bush administration that “no state with serious plans to pursue criminal prosecution of war crimes need fear undue influence from the International Criminal Court. Selective prosecution of perpetrators of universally recognized crimes also runs counter to a fundamental American principle: equality before the law.”

RUSSIAN COURT TO RETRY OFFICER FOR KILLING CHECHEN WOMAN. The coincidence would have been viewed as meaningful in Soviet times. As the Bush administration is asserting its views about justice in the international community, Dmitriy Kozak,deputy head of Russia’s Presidential Administration, assured a press conference on June 27 in St. Petersburg that the reform of the Russian justice system, ordered by President Vladimir Putin, is “on track" and will be completed this year. Then, on July 2, Russia’s justice took an unexpected step in a hotly debated case watched by those concerned with Russia’s unwillingness to hold its military accountable for crimes. The military judge, expected to announce a mild sentence for the highest-ranking Russian officer accused of committing a crime against a Chechen civilian, ordered a new psychiatric examination instead. The decision overturned the previous psychiatric examination, in May, which concluded that the officer, Col. Yuri Budanov, was suffering from shell shock and shrapnel wounds when he killed Elza Kungayeva, 18, on the night of March 26, 2000.

A day earlier, on July1, the Ministry of Defense announced its dismissal of the military prosecutor in the case, Col. Sergei Nazarov, "on account of his ill health." Nazarov’s argument was that Budanov was mentally disturbed at the time of the killing and should be prosecuted for “abuse of office,” a minor crime that would allow him to go free under an amnesty program for soldiers who had earned military honors. Nazarov’s replacement, Col. Vladimir Milovanov, agreed with the judge's decision to order a new psychiatric evaluation. According to Interfax, the new prosecutor also revised the case against Budanov who will now be tried on far more serious charges. If convicted of murder, he faces 20 years in jail.

Budanov, a decorated tank commander, has admitted that he kidnapped Kungayeva from her father's house, then raped and strangled her in his quarters, but argued that he did so in a rage, believing that she was a sniper. The trial, in Rostov-on-Don, has polarized Russia. While many Russians have spoken up for Budanov, Chechens say that his crime was only one of thousands of abuses in Chechnya gone unpunished. Imran Ezhiyev, of the Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship, a human rights organization involved in the case, has expressed satisfaction over the turn of events. "This is what we were striving for,” the press quoted him as saying. “Unfortunately, in these two years, the court has done everything for the sake of the accused."

THE KRYASHEN BREAK THE MOULD. About 300,000 Kryashen live in Tatarstan, making up eight per cent of the population, but they differ from other citizens of that autonomous republic because of their traditional affiliation with the Orthodox Church, and thus they create a problem – and an opportunity -- for Moscow's policy to rein in the Russian regions, Keston News Service reports. The Kryashen --a corruption of the Russian word for "baptized" -- insist that they are a separate ethnic group and plan to declare that in the forthcoming nationwide census. On the federal level, however, the “traditional" confessions are seen as corresponding to a particular ethnicity: Orthodoxy with Russians, Islam with Tatars and Chechens, Buddhism with Buryats and Kalmyks. “While giving minority religions a certain space, the fusion of Russia with majority Orthodoxy emphasizes the homogeneity of the nation and can underpin imperialist, centralized policy,” reports Keston’s Moscow correspondent Geraldine Fagan. “Since everyone except the Kryashen themselves believes that the Kryashen are Tatar, according to this model of national-confessional identity they would be expected to be Muslim -- and so cease to exist, making the Tatar nation larger and more deserving of its semi-autonomous status.”

Secular and Muslim Tatars, as well as the Orthodox Archbishop of Kazan and Tatarstan Anastasi insist that there is no difference between the Kryashen and other Tatars as the Kryashen are baptized Tatars. The argument is not simply academic. A Kazan specialist in Islamic studies, Rafik Mukhametshin, is quoted as saying that the existence of the Kryashen is politically advantageous to Moscow. Since Tatars are the second largest nationality in the Russian Federation, he says, their interests may be ignored only by splintering them. "In Tatarstan 52 per cent are Tatar,” Mukhametshin says. “But if you take away the Kryashen, then the [Tatars] become a minority in their own republic, which becomes a mere province."

‘THE WHIM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS’ TRUMPS THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL.

Repressive measures can be so devious that it takes months to find out how they work out. Such is the case of the rejection of repressive new Kazakh religion law and its subsequent adoption in practice.

Last January, the lower and upper chambers of the Kazakh parliament approved amendments to the religion law that would have allowed unregistered religious groups to be banned, required all missionaries to be registered, and denied legal registration to all Muslim organizations outside the framework of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan. Surveying opinions among religious communities, the Keston News Service found that only the Spiritual Administration offered unequivocal support for the new law, while a range of faiths offered strong criticisms, as did the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). President Nursultan Nazarbayev referred the new law to the Constitutional Council, which ruled that some of its provisions violated the constitution. Nazarbayev did not object to the ruling. Thus, the old law remained in force, which was welcomed by international and local human rights organizations.

But recently, the International Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians/Baptists, one of two main Baptist jurisdictions in Kazakhstan and the one that objects to state registration on principle, has voiced alarm over “the persecution” of its congregations because they refuse to register, according to Keston. A statement by the Evangelical Christians/Baptists charges that regional officials are continuing to take to court, fine, and threaten believers despite the country’s law and despite the fact that earlier this year President Nazarbayev agreed with the Constitutional Council’s rejection of the amendments. What is more, the Evangelical Christians/Baptists say, regional authorities are so “blatant” in their persecution “that there can be no doubt that the central authorities are participating in and coordinating these actions.” Another disturbing thought that occurs to them is whether “the discriminatory amendments to the law on freedom of conscience” were rejected so that “the world community, pacified and satisfied by this development, would not react so strongly to the repression of believers.”

A religious affairs official at the Kazakh parliament told Keston that the Baptists’ claims of persecution were unfounded, believers must register under the law, and referred to “the small number” of Baptists who complained. But Birgit Kainz, the human rights officer at the OSCE mission in Almaty, said that “the Kazakh law on freedom of conscience and religious associations does not make registration obligatory.” She does not think that the persecution of believers who refuse to register is a deliberate state policy; “rather it is simply on the whim of local officials.” She added: “Baptists who refuse to be registered for ideological reasons form the majority of those who are currently being persecuted.”

* * * QUOTE OF THE WEEK * * * The percentage of Russians who called the situation in their country "catastrophic" has gone down from a peak of 50.7% in 1998, after the financial collapse, to 17.6% in 2000 and then dropped to 13.9% in 2001, according to a nationwide survey by the Institute of Complex Social Studies in Moscow, using research collected by other institutions.

WITH MINORITIES AT RISK, THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA IS UNCERTAIN
By Micah H. Naftalin and Nickolai Butkevich

Antisemitism, xenophobia, and religious persecution, from both official and grassroots sources, continued to threaten ethnic and religious minorities throughout Russia in 2001. From Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, from arctic Murmansk to the resort area of Krasnodar, regional authorities ignore dangerous hate groups who aim violent rhetoric and actions against minority groups, refusing to prosecute hate crimes or, at best, classifying them under the euphemism “hooliganism.” The hate groups range from skinhead gangs to structured neo-Nazi groups like the People’s National Party or the successors of Russian National Unity to officially approved paramilitary Cossack formations. With some exceptions, federal authorities have failed to take strong, consistent action to crack down on hate groups or against politicians who illegally incite ethnic or religious hatred. While there have been improvements in the reactions of the authorities to antisemitic incidents as compared to previous years, official reaction is still weak. After a decline in antisemitic incidents in 2000, the summer and early fall of 2001 witnessed a rash of beatings of Jews (Moscow, Orenburg, Kostroma, and Omsk) and arson attacks on Jewish property (Ryazan, Kostroma, Kazan), none of which have been solved. Nor have the vast majority of past antisemitic attacks—the synagogue bombings in Moscow in 1999, the attack on a Jewish school in Ryazan in 2000, and numerous other incidents—resulted in convictions.

President Vladimir Putin continues to make positive gestures toward Russia’s Jewish community, attending its events, praising the role of Jews in Russia’s history and contemporary life, and strongly condemning antisemitism. In many regions, it is no longer uncommon to see a mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the community on a holiday. This has helped create a more confident climate for Jews, spurring a continued renaissance of Jewish life in Russia, as witnessed by the growing number of synagogues being returned to the community after decades of government ownership, the increasing coverage in the media of communal activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic and international events, and a rising willingness of Jewish leaders in some parts of the country to stand up for their rights.

However, a sense of unease remains. This feeling is unavoidable, given the dark history of antisemitism in Russia and doubts about the country’s long-term stability and prosperity. The majority of Russians still live in poverty, the country’s population continues to decrease at an alarming rate, equipment and infrastructure are crumbling, and the economy remains dependent on volatile world oil prices. Russian Jews know that they are the favorite scapegoats of many demagogic politicians whose popularity may rise suddenly in the face of another economic collapse like the August 1998 crash, which led to a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in 1998-99.

Even if present economic and political trends continue and Russia remains stable, there are other reasons to worry. Jewish leaders’ assertions denying the existence of state antisemitism are only partly correct. While it is true that the active promotion of antisemitism is no longer state policy, as it was throughout much of the Soviet era, passive state antisemitism persists. While there has been some slight improvement in the enforcement by federal prosecutors of laws against the incitement of ethnic hatred, as a rule they fail to properly apply these laws, or ensure that regional prosecutors do, sending a message to antisemites that their actions will likely go unpunished. Far too much latitude has been granted to regional officials in how they react to the activities of hate groups or extremist politicians, leaving many to choose to take no action at all to protect minorities. In a November 2001 meeting with regional police officials, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Chekalin admitted as much when he stated: “We have gone too far in our inaction against extremist youth.” The consequences of this permissive attitude towards hate groups are especially clear in Moscow, where for years police ignored skinhead attacks against foreign students, dark-skinned traders, and even diplomats from African and Asian countries. Only now, when the problem has become so acute that skinhead violence is an almost daily event in Moscow, have the city authorities begun to take the skinhead problem seriously. Unfortunately, it may be too late to contain the growth of skinhead groups, which have increased their membership and geographical scope to a stunning degree. In addition, while there are some signs of improvement, cases of police idly watching as skinheads beat ethnic and religious minorities, or even engaging in such violence themselves, continue to be reported throughout the country. Speaking to a Russian reporter at the UN’s World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Intolerance in Durban in September 2001, Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the “Panorama” think tank—a leading authority on extremist groups in Russia—put the problem succinctly: “Extremist pro-Nazi paramilitary organizations propagandizing the ideas of racial hatred operate openly in Russia, and the state does nothing to prevent this.”

This trend of passive state antisemitism and racism is even more apparent in the judicial branch. Many judges refuse to punish antisemites and other extremists, even when they have clearly violated the law. While the justice system tends to come down hard on even minor offenses, antisemitic and racist violence is often treated with kid gloves. According to “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”: “For stealing a chicken, you can get eight years, but for a pogrom, several months.”

The State Duma remains a hotbed of antisemitism and racism, especially among Communist deputies. State Duma deputies from Bryansk and Krasnodar Kray regularly violate laws against public hate speech, as does Deputy Speaker of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Hate literature is openly sold in the State Duma, including David Duke’s “The Jewish Question Through the Eyes of an American” and several rabidly antisemitic newspapers.

On the regional level, President Putin has made some impressive progress in reversing years of radical decentralization under his predecessor. Many regional laws have been brought into accordance with federal legislation, secessionist movements that threatened the Russian Federation have been undercut (with the obvious exception of Chechnya), significant sources of revenue have been redirected from the regions to the center, and the central government has achieved the right to remove governors who abuse the law. However, the central government remains weak, and this weakness, when combined with the indifference of many central government officials to the problems of antisemitism, racism, religious persecution, and other human rights violations, has helped create a system of government in which regional leaders make some basic concessions to the Kremlin in return for the right to treat their citizens any way they choose. As a result, minority groups are treated differently from region to region, largely at the whim of the local bosses. The Jewish community is a case in point. In a few extreme cases they are demonized by regional leaders (Kursk, Krasnodar) or by media controlled by the regional administration (Vladimir, Oryol, Bryansk), in a few more their concerns are taken seriously (the Moscow city administration being the most important example), while in the bulk of Russia’s regions, the authorities neither attack nor adequately defend Jews against grassroots antisemitic violence. In a prime example of collaboration between hate groups and regional authorities, in at least four regions (Ryazan, Voronezh, Tver, Republic of Mari-El), local newspapers reported that a successor organization to the RNU (Russian Rebirth) was officially registered in 2001—two years after the RNU was banned in Moscow. In late December 2001, a Jewish leader from Borovichi gave a possible reason why groups like the RNU continue to attract support in the provinces: “Small cities are of special interest to extremist organizations. The low level of life, the low education level of the population, and the large fall in the economy are all potential soil for new members.”

The manner in which President Putin is tackling the problem of the central government’s weakness shows an alarming tendency on his part to focus on the levers of power rather than on the rule of law. Jews and all other citizens will never be truly safe until a democratic, law-based system develops. Yet Russia under Putin seems to be sliding more and more toward authoritarianism.

A disturbing trend that emerged after the September 11 attacks is the radicalization of some of Russia’s Islamic community. A few Russian Muslim leaders, most but not all self-proclaimed, publicly repeated the radical Islamist canard that Israel planned the September 11 attacks. Rallies in support of the Taliban and the PLO have taken place in some predominantly Muslim regions. So far, such opinions are shared by a small minority of Muslims mostly concentrated in Chechnya and Dagestan. Yet this is a growing trend that requires continued monitoring.

Other ethnic and religious minorities continue to be subjected to violence and intimidation, both from official and grassroots actors. Chechens and other so-called “people of Caucasian nationality”—a widely used racist term used to describe people from the Caucasus, millions of whom live in Russia—continue to be subjected to police shakedowns and skinhead attacks in almost every region and city. Dark-skinned foreign students, tens of thousands of whom reside in Russia, are regularly beaten by skinheads and, with a few exceptions, police do nothing to defend them. Meskhetian Turks, Armenians, and other groups are targeted by an official policy of racism in Krasnodar Kray, where officials deny them the most basic rights and empower Cossack paramilitary groups to beat and harass them. Krasnodar Kray is the most extreme example of the problem of vigilante Cossack formations; most Russian cities now have such groups, many of which are explicitly racist, working in cooperation with police or as private security guards. According to an “Izvestiya” report last March, Cossacks have 700 officially registered Cossack organizations.

When it comes to racism, there has been no improvement of the climate in Russia; instead, the situation has gotten noticeably worse. One of Russia’s leading pollsters—Yuri Levada—revealed in December 2001 that around 40% of Russians believe that non-Russians are bad people. Despairing of police protection, some targeted minority groups are beginning to form self-defense units, raising the specter of ethnic clashes.

As in past years, the Russian Orthodox Church whips up hysteria about minority Christians, labeling them “totalitarian sects” and even tools of foreign intelligence agencies bent on breaking apart Russia in a “spiritual attack.” The Orthodox Church remains a bastion of extreme anti-Western views. In December 2000 Patriarch Alexi II accused the West of waging “a well planned, bloodless war…against our people, aimed at exterminating them.” These views are often reflected back onto minority Christian groups, perceived as “non-Russian” or “Western” despite the historical presence of many of these faiths in Russia. In some regions, local authorities collaborate with the Orthodox Church by denying minority Christians registration or by demonizing them in the local press. In full view of a thunderstruck foreign press corps, the Moscow city authorities tried to disband the Salvation Army and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, though they were ultimately unsuccessful. In October 2001, Mikhail Odintsev—chief of the Department on Religious and National Questions for the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation—reported that in 2000-2001, his office received around 1,000 complaints from people of various faiths about the refusal of the authorities to register or reregister them, as well as other forms of official harassment. Grass-roots violence remains a serious problem. In late 2001, Ludmila Alekseeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group cited religious freedom advocates as speaking “about the growing number of attacks on believers, including Pentecostals, Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. People are beaten and threats are made, for the most part by law enforcement officers. This began soon after the adoption of the 1997 law [on religion] and that every year such cases have increased, which is especially alarming.”

“Islamophobia” remains widespread, reflected in the opposition by some regional authorities to the building of mosques and the tendency of much of the Russian press to equate Islam with terrorism, without taking into account the diversity of Islam. The war in Chechnya drags on, brutalizing and radicalizing Chechen civilians and creating a whole generation of rabidly racist Russian soldiers and policemen.

In the wake of September 11, it is clear that comprehensive monitoring of antisemitism and other forms of hate are more crucial than ever because of the nexus between xenophobia and terrorism. The monitoring of these phenomena in Russia gives those interested in improving conditions there a useful indicator of the state of civil society, ethnic relations, rule of law, and political stability.

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Micah H. Naftalin is UCSJ’s national director; Nickolai Butkevich is the research director.
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